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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action brought by plaintiffs (appellants)
after judgment had been obtained against them on a note held by
defendant (respondent) Bank of Ephraim, to require defendant Bank
to apply certain security held by it against the judgment debt
before proceeding against the plaintiffs (appellants) on the
judgment obtained, and for damages against all defendants arising
out of various charges of interference with business relations
and harrassment.

Defendants (respondents) Barton counterclaimed

on various grounds, including money obligations due from the
Plaintiffs.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

After trial before the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge in
the Third Judicial District, sitting with a jury, seven of
Plaintiffs' causes of action were dismissed by the Court and the
remaining three causes of action were submitted to the jury,
resulting in verdicts for Defendants and against Plaintiffs.

The

counterclaim of defendant Bertha Barton was dismissed by the
court, as was one counterclaim of defendant George Barton; the
remaining five counterclaims of defendant George Barton were
submitted to the jury, resulting in verdicts for defendant Barton
on three causes of action and against defendant Barton on two
causes of action.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

These respondents seek affirmance by this court of all
verdicts and judgments entered in the court below which are the
subject of this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

These respondents disagree with the statement of facts
set forth in Appellants' brief, but are in agreement with the
exceptions thereto as treated in the brief of the respondent Bank
of Ephraim et al.
A.

The Bank of Ephraim matter.

For several years prior to 1967 appellant Charles R.
Kennedy and respondent George Barton had been engaged in various
business transactions, and in late 1967 said Kennedy approached
George Barton relative to appellants obtaining a bank loan of
$40,000 from the Bank of Ephraim, in which Barton was a director.
The purpose for the loan was to obtain funds for the purchase by
appellants of 280 acres of land in Montana (R.733).

Indication

was given by Charles R. Kennedy that certain property could
secure the loan (R.740).

A letter of of recommendation was sent

by George Barton to respondent Bank, wherein he indicated that he
was certain the Kennedys "will furnish any amount of security you
may require.•

(R.l6-P).

The Bank granted but did not collater-

alize the loan, and one week later the note was presented to
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George Barton for his signature on the back of the note as
guarantor (R.896).

Some 60-90 days after the loan was

consummated, in response to the request of the President of
respondent Bank, George Barton endorsed a $50,000 certificate of
deposit (held in the names of George Barton or Bertha Barton or
G. DeVon Barton) as security for the Kennedy loan in order that
the bank examiners would be satisfied (R.899).
All of the proceeds of the loan were received by
appellants and were used by them to purchase the said 280 acres,
which they still own and which at the time of trial was the
subject of attachment by the respondent Bank (R.734).

Subsequent

to the consummation of the initial loan, the loan maturity dates
were extended, and the loan renewed in various amounts on
numerous occasions.

On the occasions of these renewals and

extensions appellants represented that they would pay the note
and that respondent Barton would not be

requi~ed

to make payment

(R.736, 737).
Periodically certain payments were made on the loan
balance by appellants (R.724) and on one occasion the interest
owing in the amount of $4,095.00 was paid by George Barton to
obtain an extension of time for appellants (R.915), who executed
their note in the same amount in favor of said respondent for
such payment (Ex.29-d).

At the time of trial a verdict and

judgment for the balance due on that note was rendered in favor
of respondent George Barton, and against appellants (R.549, 484).
Such verdict and judgment are not the subject of appeal.
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Appellants defaulted on the final renewal note in favor
of the Bank of Ephraim (R.734) and litigation was initiated
against appellants to collect the then balance of the loan and
other sums owing the bank; and judgment in favor of the Bank was
entered on July 25, 1973 (Ex.58-d).
that judgment.

No appeal was taken from

The respondent Barton was named as a defendant in

the foregoing action, but was not served with summons (R.788).
The appellants brought suit claiming damages arising from the
foregoing transactions.
B.

The Barclays Bank matter.

On August 24, 1970, appellant Charles R. Kennedy borrowed
$35,000.00 from the Barclays Bank of California, and as the sole
maker executed a demand note in favor of that Bank (Ex.41-d).
At the request of said Kennedy (R.937-938), the
respondent George Barton had executed an instrument of guaranty
which covered the foregoing debt obligation of the appellant
Charles R. Kennedy (Ex.42-d).

Respondent Barton received none of

the proceeds of the loan (R.937, 966).

Following default on said

note in favor of Barclays Bank of California, Charles R. Kennedy
and George Barton were sued, and judgment was awarded Barclays
Bank of California against each of them for $42,951.33, which
included principal, accrued interest, attorney's fees and costs
(Ex.43-d).

Respondent George Barton paid Barclays Bank (Ex.44-d)

and took an assignment of the judgment (Ex.45-d).

He sought and

was awarded a favorable verdict and judgment under his
counterclaim against the appellant Charles R. Kennedy in this
matter.
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C.

The Barton Syndicate matter.

In July of 1970 at the instance of appellant Charles R.
Kennedy it was agreed that said appellant and respondent George
Barton would each sell a 10% interest in the Barton Syndicate to
one, J.D. Kennedy, the total 20% interest being sold for $25,000
(R.925-926).

The instrument conveying the interests was executed

on July 29, 1970 (Ex.38-d).

Appellant Charles R. Kennedy

received the $25,000, $12,500 of which was for the benefit of
respondent George Barton (R.928).
Appellant Charles R. Kennedy failed to remit the $12,500
despite repeated demands therefor (R.929-930).

At the time of

the last demand, Charles R. Kennedy stated that he had •used the
money to live on" (R.931).

Appellant Charles R. Kennedy at trial

stated that he held the net proceeds from the J.D. Kennedy
transaction in two certificates of deposit of $10,000 each,
($25,000, less expenses and commission), one certificate in the
name of Charles R. Kennedy, and the other held jointly with his
wife, Rebecca Kennedy (R.l015; 1020).

By way of counterclaim

respondent George Barton prayed and received, a favorable verdict
and judgment in this matter.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE VERDICTS AND JUDGMENTS OF THE TRIAL COURT
IN FAVOR OF THE BANK OF EPHRAIM AND ITS
DIRECTORS SHOULD BE UPHELD

It is submitted that the verdicts and judgments of the
lower court in favor of the respondent Bank of Ephraim and its
Directors should be upheld, thereby allowing said Bank to enforce
that certain judgment entered on July 25, 1973, in the District
Court of Sanpete County, State of Utah, against the named
judgment debtors therein, which include the appellants in this
action (Ex.58-d).
In support of this position, respondents Barton adopt and
incorporate by reference herein the authorities and arguments as
set forth in the brief of the respondents Bank of Ephraim, Virgil
P. Jacobsen, Curtis T. Armstrong, L. Cannon Anderson and Ruel E.
Christensen, as heretofore filed.
In addition to such adoption and incorporation, these
respondents invite the attention of the court to certain
additional evidence in the record which is deemed pertinent to
the issues.
Under cross-examination, the appellant Charles R. Kennedy
testified as follows in reference to the initial loan of
$40,000.00 on November 27, 1967, and the renewals thereof:
"Q.

Just to - there's no question you and
your wife got $40,000.00--?

A. Law
That's
correct.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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Q.

All right. No question that you used
that money to purchase the property in
Montana, that 280 acres?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

There isn't any question that the
attachment you are complaining of is on
that 280 acres, isn't that correct?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

There isn't any question that you and
your wife defaulted on the loan--that
is, the final renewal note--isn't that
correct?

A.

On the final renewal note we defaulted,
yes. • (R. 733, 734)

********
"Q.

Well, now Mr. Kennedy, in regards to the
bank loan which you got the property to
buy, you got the money to buy the
Montana property and renewals of that
during--the renewals and extensions
covered about a five-year period, didn't
they; 1967 into 1972?

A.

Yes, Mr. Gee.

Q.

And most of the notes were for about a
60 to 90 day maturity period, were they
not?

A.

I believe that could be true.

Q.

Yes. So that there were many renewals
and many extensions during that period?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Mr. George Barton periodically would
intercede in your behalf and ask for
extensions and renewals, would he not?
Isn't that correct?

A.

Yes, because Mr. Barton's--

Q.

Well now--.

Sponsored by the
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Q.

Well--.

A.

--on many things and knew what we were
doing.

Q.

He asked for renewals and extensions
and--.

A.

Yes.

Q.

On your representation that the
obligation would be paid; isn't that
correct?

A.

That's right.

Q.

And you told the bank officers on many
occasions you would pay that note?

A.

I did.

Q.

And every time you made a renewal or
extension you promised that you would
pay?

A.

I did.

Q.

And on occasions you told Virgil
Jacobson, 'Virgil, I would'-- in effect,
'I want to pay the note'?

A.

I did.

Q.

But the bank was cooperative and went
along; did they not?

A.

They sure did.

Q.

For five years?

A.

They certainly did.

Q,

Then you wrote letters to the bank
indicating that it was your obligation,
you wanted it to stand on its own two
feet, words to that effect?

A.

That's correct.

That's correct.

Q.

You told Mr. Barton on a number of
occasions, both in relation to this note
and other notes, that he would never
have to pay a note that he guaranteed in
behalf;
isn't
correct?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law your
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A.

I did and I believed that at that time.•
(R. 935, 937)

In further reference to the Bank of Ephraim loan, on
cross-examination Charles R. Kennedy testified:
"Q. But you told him (Mr. Barton) on

repeated occasions that he would never
have to pay that: isn't that right?
A.

That is correct.•

(R.742)

The testimony of appellant Rebecca Kennedy was to a
similar effect (R. 824, 825).
The foregoing evidence clearly indicates that the
appellants acknowledged receipt of the proceeds, and their
primary obligation to pay the Bank of Ephraim loan, and sets
forth their representations in that regard to both Bank officials
and respondent George Barton.
Some two years after the initial loan by the Bank of
Ephraim, appellant Charles R. Kennedy, on November 18, 1969,
wrote the Bank, in part, as follows:
"Gentlemen:
RE: OUR LOAN OF $45,000.00
Within a few days our note for
$45,000.00 shall be due for payment plus
interest. I wish to mention now, Mr.
Jacobsen, a matter that has been very
close to my heart. When I first sought
a loan from your bank it had been my
desire for my loan to stand on its own
feet - as all my obligations have stood
in the past. I am rather proud of my
record over the past years, for it
represents many hours of work. Instead,
my loan was secured by the signature of
Mr. George Barton - and as I now understand the matter, by his collateral
as well.
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********
This should not be, for my assets over
my debts would warrant such a loan - and
- I have treated my loan at your bank
with honor; and every loan I have been
granted in my lifetime.
I would like for my obligation at your
bank to stand on its own feet.***"
(Emphasis added)

(Ex. 28-d)

As late as April 15, 1972, a few days before the Sanpete
County litigation was initiated, appellant wrote Virgil Jacobsen,
President of the Bank, a letter, the tenor of which indicates his
primary liability (Ex.33-d).

In that letter he writes, in part:

"I wish to pay that note, Virgil***"
The last renewal note of the subject Bank loan, upon
which suit was brought by the respondent Bank, was executed by
the appellants, and only by the appellants, as makers.
Respondent Barton appears in the capacity of guarantor on the
reverse side of the note (Ex. 58-d}.

Further evidence of the

appellants recognizing their primary liability is seen in the
payment of certain sums on the loan balance by them (R.724).
one occasion when interest in the amount of $4,095 was paid by
respondent George Barton, to obtain an extension of time for
appellants (R.915), the appellants executed their note in the
same amount in favor of such respondent (Ex.29-d).
From the foregoing testimony and evidence, as well as
that cited by the other respondents in their brief, which is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On

herein incorporated, it is clear that the intent and agreement
was that the appellants Kennedy were to be primarily liable to
pay the Bank of Ephraim obligation.

The claim by the appellants

that there was an oral agreement that the certificate of deposit
would be the first source of funds in the event of default is
without any support in the record, and is in fact refuted by the
record (R. 795; 769; 785-787; 894-900).

Considerable time

elapsed before the appellants Kennedy even knew of the
certificate (Ex. 28-d; R. 822).

Any claim by the appellants as

to such oral agreement partakes of appellate fantasy.
The appellants claim the non-applicability of res
judicata, a defense raised by all the respondents, based upon the
judgment rendered in the District Court in and for Sanpete
County, State of Utah, as aforementioned (Ex. 58-d).

In support

of their position in this regard, appellants cite the Utah case
of Richards v. Hodson, 26 U. 2d 113; 485 P. 2d 1044, and quote
part of a paragraph of that decision.

The full paragraph reads:

"Strictly speaking, the term 'res
judicata' applies to a judgment between
the same parties who in a prior action
litigated the identical questions which
are present in the later case. Not only
are the parties bound by the ruling on
matters actually litigated, but they are
also prevented from raising issues which
should have been raised in the former
action. The rule of law is wise in that
it gives finality to judgments and also
conserves the time of courts, in that
courts should not be required to
relitigate matters which have once been
fully and finally determined." (Emphasis
added.)
The liability of the appellants to the respondent Bank
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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under their promissory note in question was fully and finally
determined in the Sanpete County litigation.
from the judgment rendered.

No appeal was taken

Under Richards, the appellants

cannot relitigate the issue of their liability, and the defenses
of res judicata and collateral estoppel are available to
respondents on that issue.

Nor can the appellants now raise

issues against the respondent Bank which should have been raised
in the former action.
In their statement of facts and arguments, appellants
claim respondent George Barton was paid a commission or finder's
fee for the initial Bank of Ephraim loan.

However, respondent

testified the funds were accepted to apply on a pre-existing debt
(R. 801-802).

Appellants further assert that George Barton

acknowledged that he hoped to be paid for his
to obtain the loan.

se~vices

in helping

This assertion is incorrect -- the services

about which respondent George Barton was testifying related to
employment by the Kennedy Corporation, for which services he was
never compensated (R. 980).
Aside from its irrelevancy, the claim by appellants that
they are unable to pay the loan in question is without substance.
The financial statements of appellants, including the value of
the 280 acres in Montana alone, indicate the ability of
appellants to pay their obligation.

(Ex. 25-d; 30-d; 33-d;

R.809, 903).
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As indicated, these respondents adopt and incorporate by
reference the argument and authority as set forth in the brief of
the respondent Bank of Ephraim, et al.

By reason of the same,

and the additional argument and authority herein made, it is
submitted that the verdicts and judgments in favor of said Bank
and its directors at the trial below should be affirmed.

The law

was correctly applied in this case and the instructions proposed
by appellants, numbers 2, 6 and 17 were properly refused.

Point II
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN,
NOR PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS REFUSED, NOR IN THE
VERDICT RENDERED OR JUDGMENT THEREON, RELATIVE
TO THE FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER DEFENDANT
BARTON'S COUNTERCLAIM

The appellant Charles R. Kennedy has challenged the
verdict of the jury, and judgment thereon, in favor of respondent
George Barton under the Fifth Cause of Action of said Barton's
counterclaim, said appellant claiming error by reason of the
trial court failing to give his proposed instruction No. 16.

The

ultimate position of the appellant in this regard would require a
reduction of such judgment in favor of George Barton by one-half.
In this particular matter, appellant Charles R. Kennedy
on August 24, 1970, borrowed $35,000.00 from the Barclays Bank of
California, and as the sole maker executed a demand note in favor
of that Bank, the loan amount bearing interest thereunder at the
rate of 9% per annum (Ex. 41-d).
At the request of said Kennedy (R.937-938), respondent
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George Barton had executed an instrument of guaranty which
covered the foregoing debt obligation of the appellant Charles R.
Kennedy (Ex. 42-d).

Respondent Barton received none of the

proceeds of the loan (R.937, 966).

Following default on said

note in favor of Barclays Bank of California, Charles R. Kennedy
and George Barton were sued, and judgment was awarded Barclays
Bank of California against each of them, for $42,951.33, which
included principal, accrued interest, attorney's fees and costs
(Ex. 43-d).

(In the Barclays Bank proceeding in the lower court,

including the rendition of the judgment, both Charles R. Kennedy
and George Barton were represented by common counsel, Weston
Bayles, as reflected in the file of that case, Civil No. 203369,
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, of
which the trial court took judicial notice.
represented Mr. Charles R. Kennedy.)

Mr. Bayles regularly

Respondent George Barton

paid Barclays Bank (Ex. 44-d) and took an assignment of the
judgment (Ex. 45-d).
The appellant Charles R. Kennedy apparently claims,
because he signed the instrument of guaranty, as well as being
the sole maker of the Barclays Bank note, that by reason of the
terms of the guaranty as to joint and several liability, the
principle of contribution limits the obligation of said Kennedy
to one-half of the aggregate amount.

The law is to the contrary.

According to the case of Hampel et at v. Mitchell, 36
F.2d 223:
"***There is no right of contribution in
favor of one who owes the whole of a
debt as principal against his surety.•
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72 C.J.S., Principal and Surety, §353, p.815 states the rule as
follows:
Where the relationship between a surety
and another is not that of cosuretyship,
the right and liability to contribution
based on such relation does not exist.
Accordingly, a surety is not liable for
contribution to his principal; nor can a
person who, although appearing to be a
surety on an instrument, is in fact the
principal, having received part or all
of the sum borrowed, or who has subsequently become the principal by
assuming the indebtedness, have contribution from a surety for the debt.***
See also Taylor v. Joiner, (Ark.) 24 S.W.2d 326.
Further, it is submitted that the citations of appellants
are inapplicable to the facts of this case, for the true
relationship of appellant Charles R. Kennedy and George Barton in
the Barclays Bank matter is that of principal, and guarantor or
surety, respectively.
According to 38 C.J.S., Guaranty, Sl, p. 1129:
A "guaranty" or "guarantee" may be
generally defined as a collateral
promise or undertaking by one person to
answer for the payment of some debt or
the performance of some contract or duty
in case of the default of another
person, who in the first instance is
liable for such payment or performance;
a collateral promise or undertaking to
pay a debt owing by a third person in
case the latter does not pay. It is an
agreement by one person to answer to
another for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of a third person;***

See also 72 C.J.S., Principal and Surety, §2, p. 515.
As noted, appellant Charles R. Kennedy was the sole maker
of the note in question, the obligation of respondent George
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Barton being secondary.
By reason of the foregoing relationship of the parties
the doctrine of subrogation is here controlling.
According to 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Guaranty Sl27, p. 1135:
•The doctrine of subrogation may be
invoked by the guarantor where the
principal debtor has defaulted in the
payment or performance of his obligation
and the creditor has enforced the
contract of guaranty. In this
situation, the guarantor is substituted
in place of the creditor and is entitled
to assert any rights that the latter may
have had by way of proceeding against
the debtor or by resort to security.
The debtor's obligation to pay the debt
is, therefore, not extinguished by the
guarantor's payment thereof. However,
even though the guarantor has taken an
assignment of the obligation, he can
recover from the principal only the
amount which he paid for the
obligation.•
•The guarantor's cause of action against
the principal debtor accrues without any
demand or notice of the payment. A
judgment against the guarantor obtained
in a court of competent jurisdiction,
and paid by the guarantor, if not shown
to be fraudulent, establishes the
liability of the debtor to the
guarantor.***•
•where the guaranty was executed at the
debtor's request, the debtor is said to
have impliedly agreed to reimburse the
guarantor.***"
In 72 C.J.S., Principal and Surety, Section 316, pp 777-779, it
is stated:
•rn the absence of an express agreement,
there is, in a relationship of principal
and surety, an implied contract that the
principal will indemnify or reimburse
the surety for any payment the latter
may make to the creditor or any loss he
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may sustain in compliance with the
contract of suretyship, and save the
surety harmless. This implied contract
has been held to arise or take effect
when the suretyship is made or
contracted, and not when payment is made
by the surety thereunder or when the
surety sustains his loss; payment merely
fixes the amount of damages for which
the principal is liable under his
original agreement to indemnify the
surety, relates back to the time the
contract was entered into by which the
liability to pay was incurred, and
matures the cause of action. Under
other authority, however, an implied
promise on the part of the principal to
reimburse the surety arises in favor of
the latter through, or immediately on,
his payment of the debt.w
83 C.J.S., Subrogation, SSO at p. 678, states:
"A judgment obtained against the
principal may be transferred by the
judgment creditor to the surety who
satisfied the judgment, and, in a
majority of states where a surety, on
paying the judgment, takes an assignment
thereof either to himself or a third
person, he may enforce the judgment
against the principal.*** An assignment
to the surety, it is held, is subordinate to the rights of subrogation, and
the right of the surety to pursue the
assigned judgment depends on subrogation
rather than on the assignment. Indeed,
it is held that no actual assignment is
necessary; the surety is considered on
equitable principles as entitled to an
assignment, and equity will consider as
done that which should have been done,
and, if necessary for this protection,
will decree an assignment to be made."
See also 73 Am. Jur. 2d., Subrogation §124, pp. 679-680.
In the Utah case of Beaver County v. Home Indemnity
Company, et al, 88 Utah 1, 52 P.2d. 435, the discussion on
subrogation or substitution has relevance here.

In tracing the

history and applicability of the doctrine, this court has stated:
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"***It began as a rather narrow doctrine
borrowed from Roman or civil law and was
confined to the case where one
secondarily liable was compelled to pay
the debt of one primarily liable.***The
surety or guarantor was permitted to
indemnify itself from its principal by
succeeding to the rights of the creditor
against such principal. It should not
be overlooked that in many cases where
subrogation is allowed, there exists a
direct right against the principal
debtor, either by express or implied
contract. Thus, in cases of suretyship
and guaranty, there is, if not an
express contract, as in the instant
case, an implied contract that the
principal should indemnify the surety if
the latter is compelled to pay the
creditor.***Equity rapidly extended the
use of this very salutary principle
until it became apparent that the only
ultimate rule which could be said to
govern the principle is that equity
would apply it wherever it was necessary
to do equity or justice or prevent an
injustice. The principle was also
applied wherever properly pleaded facts
existed, which made the principle
applicable. Where one paid the debt of
another under duty or compulsion or a
promise so as to take that payment out
of the class of voluntary payments, as
the term voluntary was used in the law,
then equity, recognizing such debtor
should not unjustly enrich himself by
the retention of property which he
should apply to the debt, permitted the
payor of the debt to be substituted to
the creditor. Thus, the debtor was
pursued and the one which should
ultimately respond was made to
respond.*** The text-writers and
students of the subject endeavor, by an
examination of various cases, where the
doctrine had been applied, or application denied, to scientificize the
subject by classifying the cases and
deriving therefrom a set of rules; but
in the last analysis, the ultimate
principle is the only one from which it
is safe to reason, to wit, that equity
employs subrogation when that doctrine
is necessary to work out a just solution
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of the problem. Subrogation will be
extended as far as it is necessary to
accomplish this. Whenever, in respect
to the involuntary payment of a debt, it
is just and equitable that some one else
more fundamentally liable or when it
would work an inequity if ultimate
payment did not fall on him, there
subrogation will be permitted.***•
See also Running v. Widdes,

(Wise.) 190 N.W. 2d 169.

It is our conviction that the applicable law in this
instance is that of the doctrine of subrogation and not
contribution; that the instruction to the jury No. 24,

(R.466)

reflects the principle of subrogation, and in any event as a
matter of law respondent George Barton was entitled to full
recovery over and against appellant Charles R. Kennedy by reason
of the foregoing authority.

For the said appellant to ask this

court to slice in half the judgment awarded to respondent George
Barton under his Fifth Cause of Action ignores both the facts and
the law.

POINT III
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN THE INSTRUCTIONS
GIVEN, NOR IN THE VERDICT RENDERED, NOR IN THE
JUDGMENT THEREON, RELATIVE TO THE THIRD CAUSE
OF ACTION UNDER DEFENDANT BARTON'S COUNTERCLAIM

Appellant Charles R. Kennedy challenges the verdict and
judgment in favor of respondent George Barton under the Third
Cause of Action of his counterclaim.

Prior to July 29, 1970,

appellant Charles R. Kennedy introduced one J.D. Kennedy to
respondent George Barton, whereupon at the instance of said
appellant,
discussion was had regarding the Barton Syndicate
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mining claims.

It was subsequently agreed that said appellant

and respondent would each sell a 10% interest in the Syndicate to
J.D. Kennedy, the total 20% interest being sold for $25,000.00.
The instrument conveying the interests was executed on July 29,
1970 (Ex. 38-d).

Appellant Charles R. Kennedy received the

$25,000.00, $12,500.00 of which was for the benefit of respondent
George Barton.

During one period in 1970-71, Charles R. Kennedy

was authorized by George Barton to invest such proceeds in
acquiring a controlling interest in a certain corporation, which
investment was not consummated (R.976-977).
Appellant Charles R. Kennedy failed to remit the
$12,500.00 despite repeated demands therefor (R. 929-930).

At

the time of the last demand, Charles R. Kennedy stated that he
had "used the money to live on"

(R. 931).

Appellant Charles R.

Kennedy at trial stated that he held the net proceeds from the J.
D. Kennedy transaction in two certificates of deposit of
$10,000.00 each,

($25,000.00, less expenses and claimed

commission), one certificate in the name of Charles R. Kennedy,
and the other held jointly with his wife, Rebecca Kennedy (R.
1015; 1020).

The jury verdict and judgment in favor of

respondent George Barton relative to the foregoing transaction
was in the sum of $12,000.00.
In an attempt to obscure or excuse his flagrant failure
to remit and account for the proceeds due respondent George
Barton, as aforesaid, appellant Charles R. Kennedy refers to an
unrelated and separate transaction in which respondent George
Barton and Charles R. Kennedy, as trustee for Anna R. Kerch, each
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acquired a 12 1/2% interest in the Barton Syndicate from one M.
S. Rosenberger, in December of 1971.

In that transaction,

Rosenberger had contacted respondent George Barton for the
purpose of selling his 25% interest, and indicated he would not
sell to Charles R. Kennedy under any circumstances (R.971-972).
A sale price of $1,000.00 was negotiated by George Barton (R.
982).

Charles R. Kennedy proposed to George Barton that he

(Kennedy) would put up the full purchase price in return for onehalf of the interest, inasmuch as he could not buy from
Rosenberger. The transaction closed on such proposal (R. 982983).

There was no discussion or agreement that the Rosenberger

transaction had any relation to the J.D. Kennedy transaction, or
that it would excuse any indebtedness owing by Charles R. Kennedy
to George Barton arising from the J. D. Kennedy transaction (R.
983).
Appellant Charles R. Kennedy in his brief in essence
claims because he and George Barton participated in the
Rosenberger venture which resulted in a so-called "good deal",
that somehow he is relieved of the fiduciary duty of remitting
funds which he held for the benefit of said Barton arising out of
a separate and distinct transaction.

To adopt the argument of

appellant Charles R. Kennedy in this matter is to allow him to
realize $24,000.00 cash, and George Barton no cash return
whatever, even though both sold and purchased equal interests in
the syndicate, which admittedly would be a "good deal" for
Charles R. Kennedy, but hardly meet equitable standards as to
respondent George Barton.
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Appellant Charles R. Kennedy in effect complains that the
jury should have been instructed in such a way as to consider the
basics of his argument.
deficient.

As noted, the argument is inherently

Moreover, a careful reading of the requested

instructions of appellants reveals no such instruction covering
the point so argued in their brief; nor could the objection of
appellants to Instruction 21 convey to the trial court what
appellants now claim as error (R.l069).
In the case of Kesler v. Rogers,

(Utah) 542 P.2d 354,

this court stated:
Defendants' contention of error in the
instructions to the jury centers upon
the failure of the court to tell the
jury that because the interrogatories
submitted to them concerning the intent
of the parties involved conflict with
written instruments, they must find such
facts by clear and convincing evidence.
Plaintiff's rejoinder to this, in which
we see merit, is that the defendant did
not submit a request for such an
instruction. Moreover, in the taking of
exceptions to the instructions which
were given, there was no clear and
correct statement to the court as to
what instructions defendant desired in
that regard. He is therefore not in a
position to complain about failure to
give a correct instruction.
See also Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Shupe v.
Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246; Pettingill v. Perkins, 2
Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185.
Further, the Rosenberger transaction was not set forth as
an affirmative defense in the pleadings by appellant Charles R.
Kennedy.

[R.l38-140 (Reply to Counterclaim of George Barton)]

Evidence
to that
transaction
was
objected
to
by andrespondents
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Barton as being "immaterial, irrelevant, outside the scope of the
pleadings***" (R.971, 972).

The objection was overruled (R.972),

but no motion was made by appellants to amend their pleadings.
Finally to theorize on why the jury entered its verdict
in favor of respondent George Barton on his Third Cause of
Action, in the amount of $12,000.00, instead of $12,500.00, is
sheer speculation.

If anyone has standing to complain of that

differential, it is respondent George Barton, not the appellant
Charles R. Kennedy.

It is not prejudicial to the appellants.

As

was stated by this court in Ewell and Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City
Corporation, 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283:
There is a truism which can be safely
indulged: in any lawsuit such as this
of several days' duration, counsel can
usually find something to complain
about. Nevertheless, when the parties
have had a full and fair opportunity to
present their case, and the jury has
rendered its verdict and the trial court
has entered its judgment thereon, all
presumptions favor their validity; and
the burden is upon the appellant as the
attacker to show some substantial basis
for upsetting them. It is well established by our Rules of Procedure, derived from statute, and by our decisional law that we will not reverse
because of mere error, but only if it is
substantial and prejudicial in the sense
that there is a reasonable likelihood
that unfairness or injustice has
resulted. We are not persuaded that any
such circumstance exists here. Consequently there is no sufficient basis to
justify disturbing the verdicts and
judgment.
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CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing argument and authorities
cited, the verdicts and judgments entered in favor of these
respondents should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONK E, BOYER & BOYLE

ondents Barton
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